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A Longitudinal Study of Cognitive Abilities
in Williams Syndrome
Melanie Porter and Helen Dodd
Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
This longitudinal study assessed cognition in Williams syndrome (WS) over a 5 year period using the
same test battery over the two occasions of testing. The aim was to explore whether absolute levels of
ability and relative cognitive strengths and weaknesses remain consistent over time. 27 participants
with WS were assessed using the Woodcock Johnson Test of Cognitive Ability – Revised (WJ-R
COG, Woodcock & Johnson, 1989, 1990). Results suggested some developmental progress over
time, but at a slower rate than typically developing peers. Cognitive strengths and weaknesses were
consistent, at least on those abilities assessed using the WJ-R COG.
Williams syndrome is a genetic disorder with a cognitive phenotype characterized by global intel-
lectual impairment (typically within the mild to moderate range), and peaks and valleys in more
specific cognitive abilities (Bellugi, Mills, Jernigan, Hickok, & Galaburda, 1999; Mervis, Morris,
Bertrand, & Robinson, 1999; Sigman, 1999; Woodcock & Johnson, 1989, 1990). Commonly
reported strengths include: auditory processing, auditory short-term memory, and receptive
vocabulary (Don, 1999; Jarrold, Baddeley, & Hewes, 1999; Mervis, Robinson, Bertrand, &
Morris, 2000). Common cognitive impairments include: spatial processing, psychomotor skills,
and processing speed (Howlin, Davies, & Udwin, 1998, Mervis et al., 2000). The majority of
studies on cognitive functioning in WS have focused on a single “snapshot” in time; very few
longitudinal studies of cognitive functioning in WS have been conducted. Consequently, it is
unclear how various cognitive abilities change over time in this population and whether they
follow the typical developmental trajectory. This study uses a longitudinal design to investigate
whether cognitive ability, cognitive strengths and weaknesses, and general intellectual ability in
WS are consistent over time.
Jarrold, Baddley, Hewes, and Phillips (2001) examined whether the profile of verbal and non-
verbal discrepancy in WS is consistent over time by exploring the development of vocabulary
(using the British Picture vocabulary Test; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintilie, 1982) and pattern
construction (using the Differential Ability Scales, Elliot, 1990) in a longitudinal study of 15
children and adults with WS who were assessed on these tasks six times over a 40 month period.
Jarrold et al. (2001) reported that mental age equivalent scores for vocabulary increased more
rapidly than mental age equivalent scores for the pattern construction task over time, and con-
cluded that vocabulary and pattern construction abilities develop at different rates in WS. They
Correspondence should be addressed to Melanie Porter, Department of Psychology, Building C3A, Macquarie
University NSW, Australia 2109. E-mail: melanie.porter@psy.mq.edu.au
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256 PORTER AND DODD
suggested, based on their findings, that the profile of verbal and nonverbal discrepancy in WS
becomes more apparent with development, with diverging verbal and nonverbal abilities in WS.
One other longitudinal study suggests that Full-Scale IQ, Verbal IQ, and Nonverbal IQ may
change (or, more specifically, increase) over time in this population. In their longitudinal study,
Udwin, Davies, and Howlin (1996) administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children–
Revised (WISC–R) to 23 individuals with WS on an initial occasion and the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale– Revised (WAIS–R) at a 4 year follow-up and found a significant increase, on
average, in Full-Scale IQ, Verbal IQ, and Nonverbal IQ scores over time. This suggests that the
gap actually closes between WS individuals and their peers over time.
In contrast to the above studies, which suggest change over time in WS, three longitudinal
case studies have been published, focused specifically on early language development in WS.
Although these studies focus on only one or two select case studies, findings suggest that lin-
guistic abilities in WS are consistently impaired over time (Capirci, Sabbadini, & Volterra, 1996;
Levy, 2004; Stiles, Sabbadini, Capirci, & Volterra, 2000).
Thus, to date, very little longitudinal research on cognitive functioning in WS has been con-
ducted, with some studies suggesting change over time (Jarrold et al., 2001; Udwin et al., 1996),
consistent with cross-sectional studies that also indicate change in verbal and nonverbal abili-
ties over time in WS (Paterson, Brown, Gsodl, Johnson, and Karmiloff-Smith, 1999; Vicari et
al., 2004). In contrast, other longitudinal research suggests consistent cognitive abilities over
time in WS, at least in terms of language skills (Capirci et al., 1996; Levy, 2004; Stiles et
al., 2000). While the above studies have contributed greatly to our knowledge, some general
methodological challenges relating to both cross-sectional and longitudinal research are worth
considering, along with ways to enhance future work in the area, these include: (1) Use of
the same tests and test batteries; (2) Use of standard scores to accurately assess developmen-
tal trajectories; and (3) Assessing a wide range of cognitive abilities. These methods are now
discussed.
USE OF THE SAME TESTS AND TEST BATTERIES
To date, little research has made cross sectional or longitudinal comparisons using the same
cognitive tasks; an exception is Jarrold et al.’s work using the British Picture Vocabulary Test
and the Pattern Construction task from the Differential Ability Scales (see above). While it is not
always appropriate to use the same cognitive tasks, particularly when comparing young infants
with older children and adults, where possible it is important that the same tests are used. Use of
the same test at two time points, and ideally use of the same test battery where subtests are from a
single test kit ensures: (a) that the same cognitive abilities are being tapped in both instances and
(b) that the same normative reference group is used for each test (see also later). As Baron (2004)
highlights, test scores are only comparable when a test is standardized on the same population
sample, and scores “are not directly comparable when they are derived from different tests” (p.
78). This later point is also important for examining cognitive strengths and weaknesses. In order
to evaluate strengths and weaknesses over time in WS, it is important that scores based on the
same normative reference group are used, as otherwise scores are not comparable across tasks
(Baron, 2004; Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2004).
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USE OF STANDARD SCORES TO APPROPRIATELY ASSESS DEVELOPMENTAL
TRAJECTORIES
Within the literature, raw scores are most commonly reported, rather than standard scores.
While these scores can be useful, a factor to take into consideration is that, from a longitudinal
perspective, you would expect a greater increase in raw scores in a child that was younger at
the time of first testing than for an older child who is closer to cognitive maturity. In contrast,
standard scores provide a measure of how a participant compares to their age-matched peers and,
in doing so, takes into account the different patterns of growth that are expected across different
ages. Also, unlike raw scores and mental age equivalent scores, standard scores are relatively
consistent across the lifespan, beginning from around 4 years of age (Sigelman & Rider, 2006;
Weinert & Hany, 2003). For example, in their review, Sigelman and Rider assert that “even when
several years have passed, IQ [a standard score] seems to be a stable attribute: the scores that
children obtain at age 7 are clearly related to those they obtain 5 years later, at age 12” (p. 233).
Longitudinally, a change in standard score over time, therefore, reflects a deviation from the
normal developmental trajectory. Supplementary scores such as raw scores are valuable, as they
assist in the interpretation of standard scores, such as whether there has been a loss in skills, a
lack of progress (stagnation) or some progress or gain in skills.
Use of standard scores (as opposed to raw scores) is also important for examining cognitive
strengths and weaknesses. In order to evaluate strengths and weaknesses over time in WS, it is
important that standard scores (based on the same normative reference group) are used, as raw
scores are not comparable across tasks or across different age groups (Baron, 2004; Mervis &
Klein-Tasman, 2004).
ASSESSING A WIDE RANGE OF COGNITIVE ABILITIES
While most studies focus on verbal skills (in particular expressive vocabulary) and nonverbal
skills (numeracy or spatial construction abilities), there are a wide range of skills relevant to
the WS cognitive profile (Mervis et al., 2000) that are yet to be explored longitudinally, such
as short-term memory, visual processing, and auditory processing. Longitudinal research should
attempt to explore these areas of cognitive function.
OTHER METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
Other methodological challenges include: the focus on group averages despite extensive cogni-
tive heterogeneity in WS (Pezzini, Vicari, Voltera, Milani, & Ossella, 1999; Porter & Coltheart,
2005); the need to consider regression to the mean, the phenomenon whereby extreme scores are
more likely to change over time (revert closer to the mean) than scores that are less extreme; and
standard error of measurement (whether significant changes in scores are clinically meaningful
or reflect statistical error).
Two of these challenges have also been acknowledged by previous researchers. For example,
Jarrold et al. (2001, p. 430) note that “at the individual level, there is considerable variance in
the rates at which vocabulary and pattern construction abilities develop.” And, in relation to
regression to the mean, Udwin et al. (1996) acknowledged that participants in their study with
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258 PORTER AND DODD
the lowest IQ scores at first assessment showed the greatest change in scores on the second
assessment, suggesting a likely influence of regression to the mean. Regression to the mean may
be a genuine change in some instances, but a statistical artifact in other instances.
AIMS AND HYPOTHESES
The current study aimed to address some of the methodological challenges associated with cog-
nitive research and to systematically investigate whether cognitive abilities, cognitive strengths,
and weaknesses and overall intellectual ability change over time in WS, using a longitudinal
design. A single test battery that measured a wide range of abilities was conducted with thirty
individuals with WS at two time points approximately 5 years apart. Standard scores were uti-
lized to assess the developmental trajectory of various skills and the profile of skills over time.
Raw scores were utilized to explore whether there was any loss, stagnation, or gain in absolute
level of ability over time. Personalized z scores were utilized to explore individual cognitive
profiles of strength and weakness over time. Specific hypotheses included: (1) That individu-
als with WS will follow a typical developmental trajectory over time, showing similar standard
scores for general intellect and more specific cognitive abilities at time 1 and time 2; (2) That
raw scores will indicate no loss of previously acquired skills; and (3) That personal profiles of
cognitive strength and weakness will remain consistent in individuals with WS over time. Given
that some research indicates a relationship between cognitive ability and chronological age in
WS (e.g., Jarrold et al, 2001), we will also take chronological age into account when consider-
ing these questions. Findings are discussed in relation to practical and theoretical implications.
While the discussion will focus on WS, wider implications are suggested in relation to other
neurodevelopmental disorders.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty participants with WS were recruited through the Williams Syndrome Association,
Australia to take part in this longitudinal study. Due to illness or misadventure, three individ-
uals were unavailable for participation at the 5 year follow-up, leaving 27 participants in total
(13 males and 14 females). The individuals who were unable to participate at time 2 were not
atypical in terms of IQ or any specific cognitive ability when compared to the other WS individ-
uals in the final cohort. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for this cohort of 27 individuals,
including chronological age, global IQ, and other more specific cognitive ability levels. There
was an equal representation of children and adults in our cohort. Table 1 illustrates that our
WS cohort is representative of the typical WS population, who are generally reported to display
a mild to moderate intellectual disability, on average, and a relative strength in auditory pro-
cessing, language, and short-term memory and weakness in spatial and psychomotor skills and
processing speed. It should be noted that speed of processing tasks also assess spatial skills, a
known weakness in WS (Bellugi et al., 1999; Mervis et al., 1999) (see see below).
All participants exhibited the medical and clinical phenotype associated with WS and genetic
testing (a FISH test) confirmed the characteristic WS deletion (absence of one copy of the elastin
gene on chromosome 7) in our participants (Fryssira et al., 1997).
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics for the WS Cohort and Change in Cognitive Factor Standard Scores Over Time
Time 1 Time 2
Correlations
Between Time 1
and Time 2
Chronological Age 16.16 (10.20), 5.00–44.67 21.92 (10.31), 10.75–50.16
IQ 44 (18), 16–78 47 (17), 13–76 .81∗∗
Short-Term Memory 67 (12), 47–96 67 (11), 50–90 .80∗∗
Processing Speed 43 (20), 12–89 45 (17), 18–78 .81∗∗
Auditory Processing 74 (17), 27–102 79 (17), 46–111 .72∗∗
Visual Processing 61 (17), 15–102 65 (17), 17–93 .70∗∗
Comprehension-Knowledge 57 (18), 27–90 56 (15), 22–78 .80∗∗
Fluid Reasoning 64 (13), 45–95 68 (15), 41–99 .80∗∗
Oral Language 59 (15), 40–87 58 (15), 25–78 .89∗∗
Chronological age is represented in years; IQ and factor scores are represented as standard scores, with a mean of 100
and a standard deviation of 15; NS = no significant difference from Time 1 to Time 2; ∗∗ = significant correlation at
p < .01. There were no significant changes in standard scores or over time at p < .01.
The cohort was representative of the Australian population in terms of socioeconomic sta-
tus (SES). SES was obtained using the Index of Relative Socio-Economic Advantage and
Disadvantage (based on residential geographic area). The national average is 1,000 with a
standard deviation of 100, and our sample displayed a mean of 1,010 and a standard deviation of
80 (range 788–1,139).
Materials: Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Cognitive Ability–Revised
Participants were administered the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Cognitive Ability–Revised or
WJ–R COG (Woodcock & Johnson, 1989, 1990). The WJ–R COG is a widely used test bat-
tery with adequate psychometric properties (e.g., reliability coefficients and validity coefficients
>0.60, with many coefficients as high as 0.80 and 0.90; Woodcock & Mather, 1989, 1990).
Norms exist for persons aged 2 to 95 years of age, making the battery appropriate for all
participants in the current study on the basis of both chronological age and mental age (IQ).
These extensive norms also allowed us to use the same test battery for the initial and follow-up
assessment, and minimized the likelihood of obtaining floor effects. Development of the WJ–R
COG was theoretically driven; the battery is based on the Horn-Cattell Gf-Gc theory, propos-
ing two types of intelligence called fluid (Gf) and crystallized (Gc) intelligence, or innate and
learned intelligence (e.g., see Horn & Noll, 1997). There are 21 tests in the WJ–R COG, 7 core
and 14 supplemental. Further details of core and supplemental tests are provided in the WJ–
R COG Examiner’s Manual (Woodcock & Mather, 1989,1990) and in the Appendix of Porter
and Coltheart (2005). Performance on the seven core tests derives a general ability score, sim-
ilar to “full-scale IQ” on the Wechsler tests, and, when the full battery is administered, eight
cognitive factor scores are also available. Tests 1 to 14 form seven cognitive factor scores: Long-
Term Retrieval (Tests 1: Memory for Names and Test 8: Visual-Auditory Learning), Short-Term
Memory (Test 2: Memory for Sentences and 9: Memory for Words), Processing Speed (Test
3: Visual Matching and 10: Cross Out), Auditory Processing (Test 4: Incomplete Words and
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260 PORTER AND DODD
11: Sound Blending), Visual Processing (Test 5: Visual Closure and 12: Picture Recognition),
Comprehension-Knowledge (Test 6: Picture Vocabulary and 13: Oral Vocabulary), and Fluid
Reasoning (Test 7: Analysis-Synthesis and 14: Concept Formation). Tests 15 to 21 supply addi-
tional information regarding each cluster. In addition, an Oral Language score is derived from
Tests 2: Memory for Sentences, Test 6: Picture Vocabulary, Test 13: Oral Vocabulary, Test 20:
Listening Comprehension and Test 21: Verbal Analogies.
Procedure
For the purpose of this study, the full battery was administered at time 1, and the majority of tests
were administered at time 2, approximately 5 years after the initial assessment. For the second
administration, we chose not to administer three tests: Test 8 (Visual-Auditory Learning), Test
16 (Delayed Recall Visual-Auditory Learning), and Test 17 (Numbers Reversed), as these tests
seemed time consuming and stressful for our WS participants on the initial assessment, and we
felt we needed to keep the participants’ best interest at heart. This meant we were unable to
obtain a Long-Term Retrieval factor score, although other tests were administered that assessed
Long-Term Retrieval Ability–Test 1 (Memory for Names) and Test 15 (Delayed Recall–Memory
for Names, see below).
Tests were administered according to standardized instructions provided in the WJ–R COG
Examiner’s Manual (Woodcock & Mather, 1989,1990). The battery was administered over two
separate sessions, no longer than one week apart. On average, the battery took 4 hours in total
to administer (2 hours per session with breaks). Data was scored manually using the procedure
outlined in the WJ–R COG Examiner’s Manual (Woodcock & Mather, 1989,1990) and was then
checked using the computerized WJ–R COG scoring system.
RESULTS
We explored findings at a group level using standard scores and raw scores and at an individual
level using personalized z scores. For group analyses, we firstly used standard scores to explore
the developmental trajectory of WS participants over time. Here we were interested in whether
our WS individuals showed a similar relative standing to their chronological age matched peers
over time. That is, whether their level of impairment on specific cognitive functions and overall
intellectual functioning, relative to their peers, was consistent over time. Second, we inspected
raw scores to determine whether WS individuals displayed cognitive decline, cognitive stagna-
tion, or cognitive progression over time in terms of their absolute level of ability. We then moved
on to explore the relation between chronological age and change over time at the group level, to
see, for example, whether younger WS participants were more likely to show a change over time.
We then addressed whether any change could be accounted for by standard error of measurement
alone. Finally, we were interested in exploring cognitive profiles over time at an individual level
using personalized z scores. For this comparison, we were interested in whether each individual’s
personal profile of relative strength and weakness remained similar over time.
For comparisons, WJ–R COG general cognitive ability (global IQ), cognitive factor
scores (e.g., short-term memory, processing speed, auditory processing, visual processing,
comprehension-knowledge, fluid reasoning, and oral language) and the WJ–R COG subtest
scores were utilized. For raw scores, only subtest scores were reported, as there are no raw scores
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for cognitive factors. Given multiple comparisons, we set the alpha level at .01 in order to help
control for type 1 error.
The WS Group and Standardized Normative Data
General IQ and cognitive factor scores. Table 1 displays average WJ–R COG general IQ
and cognitive factor standard scores for the WS cohort at time 1 and time 2. These standardized
scores have a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. A score more than two standard devi-
ations below the normative reference group (70 or below) represents an impaired performance.
Correlations between test scores at time 1 and time 2 are also shown in Table 1 and indicate
significant moderate to high correlations.
In terms of general ability, Table 1 illustrates a mild to moderate intellectual disability, on
average, both at the initial assessment, and at the 5 year follow-up. Similarly, a repeated measures
t-test indicated no significant change in general ability level (IQ) from time 1 to time 2. This
suggests a similar relative standing to their peers over time, on average, in terms of their general
IQ (the gap does not widen or close).
For specific cognitive factors, Table 1 shows that, on average, WS individuals performed best
on the auditory processing factor, both at time 1 and at time 2. Moreover, on both occasions of
testing, average performance on this factor fell within two standard deviations of the mean per-
formance of the normative reference group, suggesting that, on average, our WS cohort was not
significantly impaired on this cognitive domain. The worst performance on cognitive factor score
was noted for the processing speed factor, where, on average, the WS cohort performed three to
four standard deviations below the mean of the normative reference group; again this was evident
on both testing occasions. The speed of processing factor measures not only speed of information
processing, but also psychomotor speed and spatial perception, so it is not unexpected that WS
individuals performed so poorly on this factor. WS individuals were impaired (that is, performed
greater than two standard deviations below the mean), on average, for all other cognitive factors
(at both time 1 and time 2). Table 1 illustrates similar scores for each cognitive factor over time,
and repeated measures t-tests also failed to indicate a significant difference for any cognitive
factor score from time 1 to time 2, on average.
Subtest scores. The left hand side of Table 2 shows average WJ–R COG standard scores
for the subtests used to comprise the WJ–R COG at time 1 and time 2; correlations between these
scores at time 1 and time 2 are also shown. Although subtest scores are less reliable than cognitive
factor scores (Woodcock & Mather, 1989, 1990), consistent with findings on the cognitive factor
scores (above), overall, there are moderate to high correlations between standard scores at time 1
and standard scores at time 2 and results on individual subtest scores suggest a similar standing
relative to the normative reference group (chronological age matched peers) over time, with no
significant differences in test scores from time 1 to time 2 for the majority of subtests. The
exceptions were Test 9 (Memory for Words) and Test 19 (Spatial Relations), where there was, on
average, a significant increase in test scores over time. The size of this discrepancy, however, was
not outside the standard error of measurement for the majority of individuals, with only 11% of
participants showing a significant and meaningful increase on Test 9 and only 30% of participants
on Test 19. “Significant and meaningful” means outside the standard error of measurement based
on the participant’s chronological age.
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Another consistency between cognitive factor standard scores and subtest standard scores
arises when comparing Tables 1 and 2. Namely, just as the cognitive factor auditory processing
is a relative strength, and, on average, is not impaired (see Table 1), so too are the subtests that
comprise this domain–Test 4 (Incomplete Words) and Test 11 (Sound Blending) (see Table 2).
Also, speed of processing is the weakest cognitive domain in Table 1, and so too are the subtests
that comprise this domain–Test 3 (Visual Matching) and Test 10 (Cross Out), which both fall
in the moderately impaired range (see Table 2). As with cognitive domains, at the subtest level,
group cognitive profiles of strength and weakness are very similar at time 1 and time 2.
Overall, results suggest a similar standing relative to the normative reference group (chrono-
logical age matched peers) over time, both in terms of general intellect and in terms of more
specific cognitive abilities. At a group level, cognitive profiles of strength and weakness appear
to be very similar across time, both at the cognitive factor level and at the subtest level.
Raw scores. The right hand side of Table 2 shows average WJ–R COG raw scores for the
subtests used to comprise the WJ–R COG at time 1 and time 2, correlations between these scores
at time 1 and time 2 are also shown. Table 2 suggests a significant increase in raw scores for the
majority of subtests (Exclusions include Tests: 1, 2, 10, 11, 15, 18, and 21 where there was no
significant increase in raw scores over time; instead, scores at time 1 and time 2 were similar).
There were also significant correlations between raw scores at time 1 and time 2 for the majority
of subtests (Except subtests: 1, 5, 6, 7, 15, and 18, where there were low to moderate, but non-
significant relationships). Table 1 suggests that, at the group level, there is progression for the
majority of subtests (that is, some gain in raw scores), stagnation for certain subtests (no change
in raw scores), but no decline or loss of skills, on average, for any subtest.
The Relation Between Chronological Age and Cognitive Change
The above analyses average across children and adults in our cohort. We were also interested to
examine whether patterns of change are affected by the age of participants. For example, whether
younger participants (children) with WS display more of a change in performance on the WJ–R
COG over the 5 year period.
In order to explore the effect of chronological age on change in scores over time, we ran
random intercept (mixed model) analyses centering chronological age at zero. Analyses were
run on difference scores (score at time 2 – score at time 1) for cognitive factor standard scores,
subtest standard scores, and raw scores. For each analysis, we ran the first model including both
linear and quadratic relationships; quadratic relationships were evaluated along with linear rela-
tionships as it is possible that performance may plateau once a certain chronological age (or
developmental level) has been reached. If the quadratic relationship was significant, no further
analyses were conducted. If the quadratic relationship was not significant, we then removed the
quadratic relationship and re-ran the analysis to explore linear relationships (Brown, & Prescott,
1962; Peugh & Enders, 2005).
Standard scores and the relationship with chronological age. Random intercept results
for the cognitive factor standard scores are shown in Table 3 and indicate a significant linear
relationship between chronological age and change in Comprehension/Knowledge scores and
Fluid Reasoning scores over the 5 year period and a significant quadratic relationship between
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TABLE 3
Change in Cognitive Factor Standard Scores Over Time With Chronological Age
Linear and Quadratic Mixed Model Linear Mixed Model
Cognitive Factors
Linear with
Quadratic Quadratic Linear+
Significant
Relationship With
Chronological Age
Short-Term Memory F = 0.055, p = .945 F = 0.488, p = .493 F = 0.500, p = .487 NS
Processing Speed F = 3.548, p = .079 F = 1.053, p = .321 F = 3.064, p = .099 NS
Auditory Processing F =1.555, p = .228 F = 2.251, p = .150 F = 0.014, p = .905 NS
Visual Processing F = 0.002, p = .967 F = 0.008, p = .931 F = 0.032, p = .859 NS
Comprehension-
Knowledge
F = 16.547, p = .001 F = 5.312, p = .033 F = 10.809, p = .004 Linear
Fluid Reasoning F = 12.792, p = .002 F = 2.189, p = .155 F = 14.245, p = .001 Linear
Oral Language F = 24.298, p = .000 F = 7.792, p = .012 — Quadratic
+The linear mixed model analysis was only performed if the quadratic relationship was not significant when the
model included both the linear and the quadratic relationship. NS = not significant.
chronological age and change in Oral Language scores over time (note this is perhaps marginal
with an alpha level of .01).
Figure 1a illustrates the significant linear relationship between chronological age and change
in Comprehension/Knowledge standard scores over time, and suggests that change in scores
over time was proportional to chronological age. Younger participants were more likely to show
a decrease in Comprehension/Knowledge standard scores over time and, as participants became
older, they tended to show an increase in test scores over time and this increase was proportional
to chronological age. Figure 1b shows a similar linear relationship between change in Fluid
Reasoning standard scores over time and chronological age. Figure 1c illustrates the quadratic
relationship between chronological age and change in Oral Language standard scores over time,
similar to a linear relationship, younger participants were likely to show a decrease in Oral
Language abilities over time and with age scores tended to increase over time. However, unlike
the linear relationship, scores then seemed to plateau at around the age of 20 years.
At the subtest level, there was a significant linear relationships between change in standard
scores and chronological age for: Test 13 (Oral Vocabulary, F = 10.849, p = .004, which feeds
into the comprehension/knowledge cognitive factor), Test 14 (Concept Formation, F = 9.134,
p = .006, which contributes to the fluid reasoning cognitive factor), and Test 21 (Verbal
Analogies, F = 8.648, p = .008, which contributes to the oral language cognitive factor). All
other analyses failed to reach significance. The linear trends were similar to those outlined in
Figures 1a and 1b.
Was there a reliable change in standard scores over time?. Because we knew
that test/re-test reliability was lower for children than for adults (Woodcock & Mather,
1989, 1990), we needed to consider whether the general decrease in standard scores for the
Comprehension/Knowledge, Fluid Reasoning, and Oral Language cognitive factors for the
younger participants reflected real change or statistical error. To explore this, we referred to
standard error of measurement scores in the WJ–R COG technical manual (these are based on
an individual’s chronological age). We then calculated confidence intervals using these standard
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FIGURE 1 The relationship between chronological age and change over
time for comprehension/knowledge, fluid reasoning, and oral language.
error of measurement scores, with each individual’s true score represented in error bands at time
1 and time 2. We found a true decrease in language capability (Comprehension/Knowledge and
Oral Language) relative to peers for 54% of participants aged 17 years or younger, suggesting
that half of the children displayed a true decrease in language abilities, relative to their peers, over
time. None of the children showed a reliable increase over time. In contrast, only 10% of adults
(participants aged 18 years and older) showed a reliable decrease in Comprehension/Knowledge
and Oral Language test scores over time and 33% of adults showed a reliable increase in
Comprehension/Knowledge and Oral Language scores over time. For Fluid Reasoning (and
all other WJ–R COG abilities), 36%, or less, of children and adults showed a reliable change
(increase or decrease in test scores) from time 1 to time 2. Of those children who did show
a reliable change, particularly a decrease in Comprehension/Knowledge or Oral Language, it
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is worth noting that there was a large age range and a wide ability range (from a moderate
impairment to a low average performance at time 1), suggesting that patterns are not occurring
only in very young children or only in children whose scores are at the higher extreme end (that
is, patterns are not indicative of regression to the mean).
Raw scores and the relationship with chronological age. Random intercept analyses
for raw subtest scores suggested significant linear relationships for: Tests 3 (Visual Matching,
F = 14.241, p = .002); Test 12 (Picture Recognition, F = 8.855, p = .007); and Test 20
(Listening comprehension, F = 27.395, p = .000) and significant quadratic relationships were
obtained for: Test 4 (Incomplete Words, F = 10.196, p = .004); Test 11 (Sound Blending, F =
9.306, p = .007); and Test 14 (Concept Formation, F = 10.115, p = .005). Linear relationships
indicated a significant increase in raw scores over time with age. Quadratic relationships indi-
cated a significant increase in raw scores over time with age and scores then seemed to plateau,
with similar scores over time for older participants. These relationships are likely to, at least par-
tially, reflect more change in younger participants, whose brains and cognitive capabilities are
developing rapidly, compared to adult participants, whose brains and cognitive capabilities are
more mature, and should, therefore, be more static.
Was there a reliable change in raw scores over time?. Examination of children’s
change in raw scores over time for the subtests that comprise Comprehension/Knowledge and
Oral Language (Test 2, Test 6, Test 13, Test 20, and Test 21) tended to suggest an increase over
time for the majority of participants. Moreover, 65% of children, on average, showed a signifi-
cant and meaningful increase outside the range of standard error of measurement on these tests.
This indicates that children are progressing on language subtests, but that they are progressing at
a significantly slower rate compared to their peers.
Personal Profiles of Strengths and Weaknesses: z Scores
We now explore whether personal profiles of cognitive strength and weakness change over time
in individuals with WS, first using cognitive factor scores and then using subtest scores. We
calculated WJ–R COG z scores for each individual, with a z score ≥2 representing a significant
personal strength compared to overall cognitive ability (or IQ) and a z score ≤–2 a significant
personal weakness compared to overall ability (or IQ). The cutoff of 2 and –2 were chosen as
they correspond to an alpha level of .05 and represent an unusual strength or weakness, which is
only observed in approximately 2 to 5% of the population (Howell, 2007).
Cognitive factors. Figures 2a and 2b show box plots of z scores for each of the cognitive
factors at time 1 and time 2, respectively. Z scores were calculated by subtracting the score on a
specific cognitive domain from the individual’s general ability level and dividing this figure by
the standard deviation (or variation) across the remaining cognitive factor scores. Comparison of
Figures 2a and 2b show a similar performance at time 1 and time 2, with considerable overlap in
the median score and range of cognitive factor scores over time.
Exploring cognitive factor z scores further at the individual case level, we calculated the per-
centage of individuals who displayed a distinct difference in cognitive strengths and weaknesses
on the WJ–R COG from time 1 to time 2. A “distinct” difference is defined as follows. A signif-
icant increase is defined as a score changing from the range ≤–2 (significant weakness relative
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FIGURE 2 Boxplots of z scores for each cognitive factor at time 1 and
time 2.
Note: STM = Short-Term Memory; SIP = Processing Speed; AUD
= Auditory Processing; COMP = Comprehension-Knowledge; VIS =
Visual Processing; REAS = Fluid Reasoning; LANG = Oral Language.
Box plots show the median, range, and extreme values for each group
on a single cognitive test. The box represents the inter-quartile range,
which contains 50% of values; the whiskers are lines that extend above
and below the box to represent the highest and lowest values and the line
across the box indicates the median. Open circles represent outliers (>1.5
inter-quartile ranges from median).
to general IQ) to ≥0 (at or significantly above general IQ level) or a score changing from the
range 0 to 1.99 (at general IQ level) to ≥2 (significantly above general IQ level). A significant
decrease is defined as a score changing from the range ≥2 (significantly above general IQ level)
to<2 [at or significantly below (≤–2) general IQ level]. Very few individuals displayed a change
in relative strengths and weaknesses over time, with no individual showing a change for Short
Term Memory or Fluid Reasoning; only 4% showing a change for Processing Speed, Visual
Processing, or Comprehension/Knowledge and 12% showing a change for Auditory Processing.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Ma
cq
ua
ri
e 
Un
iv
er
si
ty
] 
At
: 
08
:0
6 
4 
Ma
y 
20
11
268 PORTER AND DODD
Of those few individuals that did show a change, it was not the case that individuals displaying a
significant difference were those whose scores were extreme, and there was a wide range in SES,
chronological age, and IQ across these individuals who did show change.
We should acknowledge that this process of determining a change in strength and weakness
over time meant that some individuals may show a small quantitative change in relation to a
significant qualitative change (e.g., a z score change from 1.80—no personal strength or weak-
ness at time 1, to 2.02—now a personal strength at time 2) and, similarly, some individuals may
display a large quantitative change (e.g., from a z score of 1.70 at time 1 to 0.69 at time 2) but no
qualitative change. There were, however, only a few individuals who showed a small quantitative
change (a change of less than 1 z score) in the context of their significant qualitative change.
Similarly, only a minority of individuals showed a large quantitative change (a change of more
than 1 z score) in the context of no qualitative change.
Subtest scores. Exploring subtest z scores in the same way, Figures 2c and 2d show box
plots including z scores for each of the subtests at time 1 and time 2, respectively, and indicate
similar profiles at time 1 and 2. Also, as with the cognitive factor scores, very few individuals
displayed a change in relative strengths and weaknesses over time; the most change was observed
for Test 20 (Listening Comprehension), where 20% of individuals showed a change (8% showing
a significant increase (4% adults and 4% children) and 12% showing a significant decrease (all
children); other change ranged from 15% for Test 18 (Sound Patterns) to 0% for Tests 3 (visual
Matching), Test 10 (Cross Out), Test 13 (Oral vocabulary), and Test 14 (Concept Formation).
Aside from Test 20 (Listening Comprehension), where it appeared that children were more likely
to show a significant drop in relative scores compared to adults, there did not appear to be a
relationship with chronological age for other changes, and for all tests, of those few individuals
that did show a change, it was not the case that individuals displaying a significant difference
were those whose scores were extreme, and there was a wide range in SES and IQ across these
individuals who did show change.
Similar to observations for the cognitive factor scores, there were few individuals who showed
a small quantitative change (a change of less than 1) in the context of their qualitative change.
Similarly, there were few individuals who showed a large quantitative change (a change of more
than 1) in the context of no qualitative change.
Thus, examination of personal z scores for both cognitive factor scores and subtest scores
indicated that, overall, very few individuals showed a change in their personal profile of strengths
and weaknesses over time; significant strengths at time 1 typically remained strengths at time 2
and significant weaknesses at time 1 typically remained weaknesses at time 2.
DISCUSSION
This detailed longitudinal study allowed us to track intellectual abilities and a wide range of
cognitive skills over time in individuals with WS, and to explore patterns of change in these
abilities, both in terms of absolute levels of ability and personal profiles of strength and weakness.
Raw scores and standard scores were utilized, as well as subtest and cognitive factor scores and
there was consistency across results.
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There were three major findings from this study with regard to our research hypothe-
ses. First, we found that, overall, intellectual and more specific cognitive abilities in WS
followed the typical developmental trajectory. That is, the relative standing of WS individu-
als to their typically developing peers remained consistent in these areas. Second, raw score
patterns over time suggested developmental progress, overall, with some subtest scores indi-
cating stagnation, but no loss of previously acquired skills. Third, group profiles (measured
using standard scores) and personal profiles of strength and weakness (measured using person-
alized z scores in comparison to global IQ) remained consistent over time, both at the cognitive
factor and the subtest level. One finding that partially failed to support our first hypothesis
was the finding that language functions decreased over time (relative to peers) in a subset of
children with WS, a finding that is also inconsistent with previous research suggesting con-
sistent language skills over time in children with WS (Capirci et al., 1996; Levy, 2002; Stiles
et al., 2000).
What Role Does Chronological Age Play in Language Ability Over Time?
Children were more likely to show a significant and reliable decrease in language skills over time
compared to adults. Because standard scores take into consideration the fact that there is rapid
development of vocabulary and general knowledge throughout childhood, whereas in adults,
development of these skills tends to plateau, this developmental explanation cannot account for
our findings (e.g., see Woodcock & Johnson, 1989, 1990). Also, it was not the case that individu-
als with extremely high language abilities at time 1 were those who were more likely to display a
decrease in language abilities relative to peers, so our findings cannot be explained by regression
to the mean.
Other possible explanations for this decrease over time in language skills for a subset of
children in our cohort include: (1) characteristics of the language tasks themselves, compared
to other tasks on the WJ–R COG and (2) development of executive functions. In terms of the
former explanation, one possible reason for the decrease in oral language skills over time in chil-
dren with WS is that Oral Language and Comprehension/Knowledge tasks on the WJ–R COG
measure crystallized intelligence rather than fluid or innate intelligence, and are, therefore, more
reliant on environmental factors than other WJ–R COG abilities (Horn & Noll, 1997; Woodcock
& Johnson, 1989, 1990). For example, Oral Language and Comprehension/Knowledge mea-
sure vocabulary acquisition and general knowledge, and these skills develop rapidly throughout
childhood with cultural and environmental exposure, such as reading text. It could be argued, for
example, that WS children have less exposure to materials such as text (because many children
with WS have impaired reading skills), so they do not develop vocabulary or general knowledge
at the same rate as their peers. Therefore, the gap between WS children and their peers widens
over time.
A second possible explanation is that the decrease in language abilities relative to peers
reflects rapid maturation of the frontal lobes (and executive functions) in typically developing
children during this period (Anderson, Northam, Hendy, & Wrennall, 2001) and slowed or abnor-
mal frontal lobe development in WS. The subtests that comprise the Comprehension/Knowledge
and Oral Language subtests rely heavily on higher-level frontal lobe functions such as verbal
abstract reasoning, concept formation and semantics (Woodcock & Johnson, 1989, 1990), all
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abilities known to relate to frontal lobe or executive functions (Anderson et al., 2001). This
may also account for our finding of a significant decrease in Fluid Reasoning scores for a sub-
set of children, although in the majority of cases, this decrease in Fluid Reasoning represented
statistical error rather than reliable change.
Practical Implications
First, findings have practical implications for families and professionals working with individuals
with WS. Contrary to previous claims that one cannot reliably predict end states of cognition in
WS based on early cognitive assessments (Vicari et al., 2004), the findings from the current study
seem to suggest that one can make somewhat accurate predictions regarding long-term cognitive
capabilities of persons with WS (at least from age 5 years and onwards, the youngest age of
children in the current study). This is a question of obvious importance to families and also
professionals interacting with these individuals.
Furthermore, findings may also lead to thoughts about possible ways to minimize environ-
mental influences on cognitive impairment, for example, through methods such as environmental
modifications or early intervention that is targeted for specific deficits. For example, in the case of
WS, the gap between WS individuals and their peers seems to widen over time in terms of vocab-
ulary and general knowledge skills. As mentioned earlier, this may be due to a lack of exposure to
text as a result of reading difficulties. One way to assist here would be to have WS children listen
to books on tape to try and enhance their vocabulary and their general knowledge acquisition. Of
course, this environmental modification must be trialed and empirically tested to determine its
efficacy, but it serves as a good example of how environmental factors and early environmental
modification of these factors might change a child’s developmental trajectory within the context
of a developmental disorder.
Theoretical Implications
The findings of the current study also assist our understanding of theoretical issues, including
whether or not individuals with WS follow the typical trajectory in terms of brain and cogni-
tive development. To date, it remains debatable as to whether cognitive functioning is simply
delayed in WS, or whether cognitive development is distinctly different in WS compared to the
typical population, reflecting aberrant brain development. Some researchers suggest that cogni-
tive development in WS follows the typical trajectory, but that it is delayed (Capirci et al., 1996;
Levy, 2002; Stiles et al., 2000). In contrast, other researchers argue that people with WS fol-
low an atypical developmental trajectory and that their cognitive development is “fundamentally
distinct” to that of the typical population (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Paterson et al., 1999).
While cognitive development is clearly atypical in WS evident by the uneven profile of
strengths and weaknesses, longitudinal examination of each cognitive domain on the WJ–R COG
in isolation suggests some support that cognitive development may be delayed rather than atypi-
cal, at least for some cognitive abilities within this population. It is possible of course, that some
cognitive domains follow a typical trajectory, while other cognitive skills follow an aberrant path
of development. There is some suggestion that language development may, for example, follow
an aberrant developmental pathway at least for a subset of children, based on our findings in the
current study.
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Limitations
Limitations of the current research include: a small sample size; a restricted age range (with no
children younger than 5 years of age); and the use of a single cognitive battery. Future research
should aim for a larger sample size, which would allow for the possibility of subgrouping partic-
ipants into more restricted age ranges. Furthermore, while in our study we did not find evidence
to suggest greater differences between younger versus older children over time, this may be due
to our restricted age range or small sample size. The longitudinal assessment of younger children
is, thus, important. Finally, it would be useful to replicate the present findings using a different
cognitive battery and over a third time point. Other areas of interest for future research include
whether social abilities in WS are consistent over time, in particular, face processing, Theory of
Mind, and emotion recognition skills.
Conclusions
Although additional research is required, and these results need to be replicated, the current
study generally indicates consistent neuropsychological profiles in WS over time from childhood
onwards, at least on those abilities measured using the WJ–R COG. This is with the exception of
a widening gap in language development between a subset of WS children and their peers. Thus,
findings indicate that change over time in cognitive abilities is not seen in all children with WS
and depends on the domain in question, raising intriguing questions as to why this might be the
case. The article extends previous longitudinal research on WS by examining a wide range of
cognitive abilities longitudinally in a relatively large sample of individuals.
REFERENCES
Anderson, V., Northam, E., Hendy, J., & Wrennall, J. (2001). Developmental neuropsychology: A clinical approach.
Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Baron, S. (2004). Neuropsychological evaluation of the child. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bellugi, U., Mills, D., Jernigan, T., Hickok, G., & Galaburda, A. (1999). In. H. Tager-Flusberg (Ed.), Neurodevelopmental
disorders (pp. 111–136). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Brown, H., & Prescott, R. (1962). Applied mixed models in medicine. Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2006.
Capirci, O., Sabbadini, L., & Volterra, V. (1996). Language development in Williams syndrome: A case study. Cognitive
Neuropsychology, 13(7), 1017–1039.
Don, A. J. (1999). Auditory pattern perception in children with Williams syndrome. Dissertation Abstracts International:
Section B: The Sciences and Engineering, 59(8-B), 4459.
Dunn, L. M., Dunn, L. M., Whetton, C., & Pintilie, D. (1982). The British picture vocabulary scale. Windsor, Berks:
NFER-Nelson.
Elliot, C. D. (1990). Differential Ability Scales. New York: The Psychological Corporation.
Fryssira, H., Palmer, R., Hallidie-Smith, K. A., Taylor, J., Donnai, D., & Reardon, W. (1997). Fluorescent in situ hybridi-
sation (FISH) for hemizygous deletion at the elastin locus in patients with isolated supravalvar aortic stenosis. Journal
of Medical Genetics, 34(4), 306–308.
Horn, J. L., & Noll, J. (1997). Human cognitive abilities: Gf-Gc theory. In D. P. Flanagan, J. L. Genshaft, & P. L. Harrison
(Eds.), Contemporary intellectual assessment: Theories, tests, and issues (pp. 53–91). New York: Guilford.
Howell, D. C. (2007). Statistical methods for psychology. Belmont, CA: Duxbury Press.
Howlin, P., Davies, M., & Udwin, O. (1998). Cognitive functioning in adults with Williams syndrome. Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 39(2), 183–189.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Ma
cq
ua
ri
e 
Un
iv
er
si
ty
] 
At
: 
08
:0
6 
4 
Ma
y 
20
11
272 PORTER AND DODD
Jarrold, C., Baddeley, A. D., & Hewes, A. K. (1999). Genetically dissociated components of working memory: evidence
from Downs and Williams syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 37, 637–651.
Jarrold, C., Baddeley, A. D., Hewes, A. K., & Phillips, C. (2001). A longitudinal assessment of diverging verbal and
non-verbal abilities in the Williams syndrome phenotype. Cortex, 37, 423–431.
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science. Cambridge, MA:
Bradford/MIT Press.
Levy, Y. (2004). A longitudinal study of language development in two children with Williams syndrome. Journal of
Child Language, 31, 287–310.
Mervis, C. B., & Klein-Tasman, B. (2004). Methodological issues in group-matching designs: Alpha levels for cogni-
tive variable comparisons and measurement characteristics of control and target variables. Journal of Autism and
Developmental Disorders, 34(1), 7–17.
Mervis, C. B., Morris, C. A., Bertrand, J., & Robinson, B. F. (1999) In H. Tager-Flusberg (Ed.), Neurodevelopmental
disorders (pp. 65–110). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Mervis, C. B., Robinson, B. F., Bertrand, J., & Morris, C. A. (2000). The Williams syndrome cognitive profile. Brain and
Cognition, 44, 604–628.
Paterson, S. J., Brown, J. H., Gsodl, M. K., Johnson, M. H., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1999). Cognitive modularity and
genetic disorders. Science, 286, 2355–2357.
Peugh, J. L., & Enders, C. K. (2005). Using the SPSS mixed procedure to fit cross-sectional and longitudinal multilevel
models. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 65, 717–741.
Pezzini, G., Vicari, S., Voltera, V., Milani, L., & Ossella, M. T. (1999). Children with Williams syndrome: Is there a
single neuropsychological profile? Developmental Neuropsychology, 15(1), 141–155.
Porter, M. A., & Coltheart, M. (2005). Cognitive heterogeneity in Williams syndrome. Developmental Neuropsychology,
27(2), 275–306.
Sigelman, C., & Rider, E. (2006). Life-span human development. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
Sigman, M. (1999). Developmental deficits in children with Down syndrome. In H. Tager- Flusberg (Ed.),
Neurodevelopmental disorders (pp. 178–195). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Stiles, J., Sabbadini, L., Capirci, O., & Volterra, V. (2000). Drawing abilities in Williams syndrome: A case study.
Developmental Neuropsychology, 18(2), 213–235.
Udwin, O., Davies, M., & Howlin, P. (1996). A longitudinal study of cognitive abilities and educational attainment in
Williams syndrome. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, 38(11), 1020–1029.
Vicari, S., Bates, E., Caselli, M., Pasqualetti, P., Gagliardi, C., Tonucci, F., & Volterra, V. (2004). Neuropsychological
profile of Italians with Williams syndrome: An example of a dissociation between language and cognition? Journal
of the International Neuropsychological Society, 10, 862–876.
Weinert, F., & Hany, E. (2003). The stability of individual differences in intellectual development: Empirical evidence,
theoretical problems, and new research questions. In R. J. Sternberg, J. Lautrey, & T. I. Lubart (Eds.), Models of
intelligence: International perspectives (pp. 169–181). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Woodcock, R. W., & Johnson, M. B. (Eds.). (1989, 1990). Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-educational Battery–Revised:
Itasca, IL: Riverside Publishing.
Woodcock, R. W., & Mather, N. (1989, 1990). WJ–R tests of cognitive ability—Standard and supplemental batteries:
Examiner’s manual. In R. W. Woodcock & M. B. Johnson, Woodcock–Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery–Revised.
Itasca, IL: Riverside.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Ma
cq
ua
ri
e 
Un
iv
er
si
ty
] 
At
: 
08
:0
6 
4 
Ma
y 
20
11
